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Introductory Remarks 
Who were the five most important men in the Revolutionary Era? It is easy 
enough to come up with four. The fifth is the tough one: John Jay. 
1. Primary author of the New York State Constitution of 1777 that along 
with the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 served as the primary 
model for the U.S. Constitution 
2. First Chief Justice of New York 
3. Member of Congress 
4. President of Congress 
5. Minister to Spain 
6. Peace Commissioner 
7. Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
8. First president of the New York Abolition Society 
9. Co-author of The Federalist 
10. Most important man in New York’s ratification of the Constitution. Jay 
was to New York, what James Madison was to Virginia. 
11. First Chief Justice of the United States 
12. Special envoy to Britain negotiates the Jay Treaty 
13. Governor of New York 
 
Note: for those wishing to see the original manuscripts of the texts quoted, 
cross references have been added to identification numbers in the online 
image database of The Papers of John Jay. 
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 John Jay had a sense that the United States had a major role to play in 
world history. Two years after the end of the Revolutionary war, Jay wrote 
former British Prime Minister Lord Shelburne that  
“To what events this country may in the future be instrumental, is indeed 
uncertain; but I cannot persuade myself that Providence has created such a 
nation, in such a country, to remain like dust in the balance of others.”1 
 Despite the actions of other nations and individuals, America and its 
leaders would need to follow certain moral imperatives to gain and sustain 
the blessings of Providence. That meant a strict moral code. Jay would 
employ the same moral compass to plot America’s course toward greatness 
as he used in his own personal life. 
 I’m writing a book right now called “The Founders’ Character” in 
which I examine the traits that the Founders deemed necessary for a good 
moral character—these traits applied not only to individuals, but also to 
societies and to countries. Above all things, a sense of order was necessary. 
Jay felt “that nations and individuals injure their essential interests in 
proportion as they deviate from order. By order [Jay meant] that natural 
regularity which results from attention and obedience to those rules and 
principles of conduct which reason indicates and which morality and 
                                                 
1 To Lord Shelburne, New York, April 16, 1786, Henry P. Johnston, ed., The Correspondence and Public 
Papers of John Jay (4 vols., New York, 1891), 3:190.  ALS, NjP (EJ: 4070); Dft, NNC (EJ: 8172).  
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wisdom prescribe. Those rules and principles reach every station and 
condition in which individuals can be placed, and extend to every possible 
situation in which nations can find themselves.”2 
 A host of character traits was necessary: honesty, trustworthiness, 
patriotism, justice, duty, industriousness, dedication, candidness, reserve, 
prudence, manliness, fortitude, frugality, and a resignation to God’s will 
were but a few. Equally important, it was necessary to avoid bad character 
traits: apathy, arrogance, disingenuousness, faintheartedness, foppishness, 
haughtiness, intemperance, licentiousness, pride, profligacy, and vanity. 
 The events leading to the Revolution showed Jay that Britain had 
strayed from the path of order and righteousness. His service abroad, 
especially his two and a half years in Spain, convinced Jay that other 
European nations were flawed as well—particularly Spain. 
“This Government has little Money, less Wisdom, no Credit, nor any Right 
to it. They have Pride without Dignity, Cunning without Policy, Nobility 
without Honor.”3 
 Jay would shape American foreign policy on an independent, 
righteous course, but one that was also based on realpolitik. To accomplish 
                                                 
2 Charge to the Grand Jury, Richmond, Va., May 22, 1793, ibid., 3:478. Dft, NNC (EJ: 8126). 
 
3 To Gouverneur Morris, St. Ildefonso, Spain, September 28, 1781, Mary A. Giunta, ed., The Emerging 
Nation: A Documentary History of the Foreign Relations of the United States under the Articles of 
Confederation, 1780-1789 (3 vols., Washington, D.C., 1996), 1:238. Dft, NNC (EJ: 8334). 
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this goal, Americans would have to be strong morally, economically, 
politically, and militarily at home, while diplomatically and commercially 
unfettered by any long-term connections. 
 Jay’s unsuccessful years in Spain taught him “the Virtue of Patience,” 
while at the same time deepened his sense of patriotism and strengthened his 
resolve to increase the powers of Congress.4 His “honorable Exile,” as he 
called his mission to Spain, made him homesick.5 “I never loved or admired 
America so much as since I left it.” As he viewed the autocracy of Spain’s 
Charles III, his “eyes and affections” were “constantly turned towards 
America.” In comparing America with Spain, Jay believed that nothing 
could “compensate for the free air, the free conversation, the equal liberty, 
and the other numerous blessings which God and nature, and laws of our 
making, have given and secured to our happier country.”6 This was Jay’s 
difficult time of testing that would steel him for the work ahead. 
                                                 
4 Marquis de Lafayette to Robert R. Livingston, Bordeaux, March 2, 1783, Stanley J. Idzerda, ed. Lafayette 
in the Age of the American Revolution: Selected Letters and Papers, 1776-1790 (5 vols., Ithaca, N.Y., 
1977-1983), 5:105.  
 
5 To Mrs. Margaret Cadwalader Meredith, Aranjues, May 12, 1780, Richard B. Morris, ed., John Jay: The 
Making of a Revolutionary, Unpublished Papers, 1745-1780 (New York, 1975), 754.  ALS, ICN (EJ: 
13396);  Dft, NHi (EJ: 672).   
 
6 To Egbert Benson, Madrid, March [19] 1781; to the President of Congress, Madrid, April 21, 1781; to 
Robert Morris, Madrid, April 25, 1782, Johnston, Correspondence, 2:6, 19, 197. Italics added. ALS, NNC 
(EJ: 13201) and Dft, NNC (EJ: 7515); Dft, PPiN (EJ: 11968); ALS, CtY (EJ: 12335). 
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 In the fall of 1781 Jay was notified that he was to leave Madrid and 
move to Paris where he would be part of America’s peace commission. 
Congress instructed the commissioners to consult with French officials 
before taking any serious action in negotiating with the British. Jay 
expressed his concerns about this subordination to President of Congress 
Thomas McKean. “As an American, I feel an interest in the dignity of my 
country, which renders it difficult for me to reconcile myself to the idea of 
the Sovereign independent States of America, submitting in the persons of 
their ministers to be absolutely governed by the advice and opinions of the 
servant of another Sovereign, especially in a case of such national 
importance.”7 During the peace negotiations, Jay wrote to Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs Robert R. Livingston saying “Let us be honest and grateful 
to France, but let us think for ourselves.”8 This he did as the most active and 
influential member of the American peace commission. Jay’s fellow peace 
commissioner, John Adams, characterized Jay as the “Washington of 
diplomacy.”9 
                                                 
7 To President Thomas McKean, St. Ildefonso, September 20, 1781, Giunta, Emerging Nation, 1:235. LS, 
encoded, DNA (EJ: 11910) and decrypted text, DNA (EJ:  11911); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 4164). 
 
8 To Robert R. Livingston, Paris, September 18, 1782, Giunta, Emerging Nation, 582. LbkC, DNA (EJ: 
4241). 
 
9 John Adams, Peace Journal, Paris, November 30, 1782, ibid., 694.  
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 As Jay prepared to return to America in 1784, he had become a true 
Nationalist. He believed that, “every thing conducive to union and 
constitutional energy of government should be cultivated, cherished, and 
protected, and all counsels and measures of a contrary complexion should at 
least be suspected of impolitic views and objects.”10 He sensed that “The 
Rising power of America is a serious object of Apprehension to more than 
one Nation, and every Event that may retard it will be agreeable to them. A 
continental national Spirit should therefore pervade our Country, and 
Congress should be enabled by a Grant of the necessary powers [from the 
states], to regulate the Commerce and general Concerns of the 
Confederacy.”11 It is time, he wrote, for “a national spirit in our country. . . . 
It is time for us to think and act like a sovereign as well as a free people, and 
by temperate and steady self-respect to command that of other nations. It is 
but too much the fashion to depreciate Congress, and I fear that, as well as 
many other of our new fashions, will cost us dear.”12 Jay viewed “The 
jealousies respecting Congress . . . and the too little appearance of a national 
spirit, pervading, uniting, and invigorating the confederacy, are considered 
                                                 
10 To Gouverneur Morris, Passy, September 24, 1783, Johnston, Correspondence, 3:85. Dft, NNC (EJ: 
8340).  
 
11 To William Livingston, Passy, July 19, 1783, Morris, John Jay, 2:564-65.  Dft, NNC (EJ: 90225; 8283). 
 
12 To Charles Thomson, Chailot, near Paris, April 7, 1784, Johnston, Correspondence, 3:125. ALS, DLC 
(EJ: 12590); Dft, NNC (EJ: 7676). 
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as omens which portend diminution of our respectability, power, and 
felicity.” Jay was convinced that Americans possessed “too much wisdom 
and virtue to permit her brilliant prospects to fade away for want of 
either.”13 He believed that “Unless with respect to all foreign Nat
Transactions, we uniformly act as an entire united Nation, faithfully 
executing and obeying the Constitutional Acts of Congress on those 
Subjects, we shall soon find ourselves in the Situation in which all Europe 
wishes to see us, vizt. as unimportant Consumers of her Manufactures & 
Productions, and as useful Labourers to furnish her with raw Materials.”
ions and 
                                                
14 
When Jay returned home after the peace, the states were reasserting their 
authority. Ironically as the prime architect of the New York state 
constitution of 1777, Jay had done much indirectly to weaken the power of 
the Confederation government—just the opposite of what he now advocated. 
 After five years abroad, Jay returned to America in July 1784 happy 
to retire from public service. Quite concerned that so many leading public 
figures were retiring to private life, Jay let it be known that he was still 
willing to serve if called upon to do so. And Congress did just that as it 
offered Jay the position of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, previously held by 
 
13 To Alexander Hamilton, Passy, September 28, 1783, Johnston, Correspondence, 3:90. ALS, DLC (EJ: 
10346). 
 
14 Peace Commissioners to the President of Congress, Passy, September 10, 1783, Giunta, Emerging 
Nation, 1:938. LS, DNA (EJ: 9942). 
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Jay’s close friend Robert R. Livingston. The appointment surprised no one. 
Jay was America’s most accomplished diplomat, having negotiated closely 
with the three countries most important to America—Britain, France, and 
Spain. Secretary of Congress Charles Thomson wrote Jay: “I do not know 
how you will be pleased with the appointment, but this I am sure of—that 
your country stands in need of your abilities in that office.”15 
 Jay did not rush into the job. Like a good diplomat, he negotiated with 
Congress before accepting the position. He obtained an enlarged staff and 
operating budget, more autonomy (including the authority to fire staff “at his 
discretion”), and an agreement that the seat of Congress would be moved to 
New York City.16 
 A month after taking office, Congress and its new secretary had their 
first dispute. Congress had received dispatches from abroad and submitted 
them to a committee to see which dispatches would be forwarded to the 
states. Jay presented Congress with an ultimatum, the duties and rights of the 
secretary should “be ascertained with Precision.” If Congress did not want to 
accept Jay’s ground rules, he would resign with “Gratitude for the Honor” 
                                                 
15 Charles Thomson to Jay, Philadelphia, June 18, 1784, John P. Kaminski, ed., The Founders on the 
Founders: Word Portraits from the American Revolutionary Era (Charlottesville, Va., 2008), 273. Als, 
NNC (EJ: 7678).  
 
16 Congressional Committee Report, Trenton, December 14, 1784, Giunta, Emerging Nation, 2:511-12. 
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Congress had done him.17 Jay’s letter was submitted to a six-man committee 
chaired by James Monroe of Virginia. The committee accepted Jay’s 
position, despite the opposition of its chair who wrote that “I consider the 
servants of Congress in a different point of view from that in which Mr. Jay 
holds them: I would consult or not consult them at pleasure & make them 
respectful & obedient to the orders they receive.”18 Yielding to Jay’s wishes, 
Congress provided that all diplomatic communications were to pass through 
his office. All incoming papers written in a foreign language were to be 
translated, to accomplish which Jay was given funds and authorized to hire a 
translator. The secretary also received a $1,000 contingency fund.19 Jay was 
satisfied. 
 One of the first things Jay did as Secretary was to ask the state 
governors to forward to him copies of their state laws, at federal expense. 
Jay told the governors that because “the Influence of our domestic Affairs on 
our foreign” will be substantial, he felt obliged to be “accurately informed of 
                                                 
17 To the President of Congress, New York, January 23, 1785, ibid., 535. ALS, DNA (EJ: 55); LbkC, DNA 
(EJ: 1546). 
 
18 James Monroe to John Francis Mercer, New York, January 29, 1785, and James Monroe, to James 
Madison, New York, February 1, 1785, Paul H. Smith, ed., Letter of Delegates to Congress, 1774-1789 (25 
vols., Washington, D.C., 1976-1009), 22:152, 157-58. 
 
19 Congressional Resolutions Regarding the Secretary and the Department for Foreign Affairs, February 11, 
1785, Giunta, Emerging Nation, 2:550-51. 
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the State of the former.”20 Throughout his tenure as a diplomat, Jay kept 
abreast of domestic political matters. The effectiveness of his diplomacy 
depended on it. 
 Jay’s goal throughout his tenure would remain the same. He would do 
everything in his power to prevent the tone of the federal government 
“from becoming more relaxed, but that it should be invigorated in every 
manner and Degree which our Union and general Interests might require and 
a due Regard to our [state] constitutions and equal Rights permit. It is my 
first wish to see the United States assume and merit the Character of one 
Great Nation, whose Territory is divided into different States merely for 
more convenient Government and the more easy and prompt administration 
of Justice, just as our several States are divided into Counties and Townships 
for the like purposes. Until this be done the chain which holds us together 
will be too feeble to bear much opposition or Exertion, and we shall be daily 
mortifyed by seeing the Links of it giving way and calling for Repair one 
after another.”21 Jay strove to make America both virtuous and strong. His 
                                                 
20 Circular to the Governors, New York, January 29, 1785, owned by Mrs. Anne Marie Davidson & John B. 
Davidson, from the Estate of Louis G. Davidson of Chicago, Ill. Also LS, MdAA (EJ: 13259); LS, MWA 
(EJ: 2620); LS, RPB (EJ: 5262); Dft, NNC (EJ: 5706); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 1547). Later Jay complained that 
few states complied with his request. See Jay’s Report on Complaints from French Merchants, Office for 
Foreign Affairs, October 7, 1785, DS, DNA (EJ: 3864) and LbkC, DNA (EJ: 4534); and Jay to John 
Adams, New York, October 14, 1785, Dft, NNC (EJ: 13148) , and LbkC, DNA (EJ: 2437); and , Giunta, 
Emerging Nation, 2: 844, 863. 
 
21 To John Lowell, Office for Foreign Affairs, May 10, 1785, Giunta, Emerging Nation, 2:624. Dft, NNC 
(EJ: 5726); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 1642). 
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two long-range goals were (1) that America “should be always in the Right, 
and (2) that it should never be opposed or ill-treated with Impunity.”22 
 After his first year in office, Jay’s influence was described by French 
Consul General Otto:  
 Mr. Jay’s political importance increases every day. Congress appears 
to govern itself only by his impulses, and it is as difficult to obtain 
anything without the concurrence of this minister as to have a measure 
that he has proposed rejected. The indolence of most of the members 
of Congress and the ignorance of some others occasion this 
Superiority. It is much more convenient to ask the opinion of the 
minister of foreign affairs regarding all current business than to 
resolve themselves into a Committee, so that Mr. Jay’s prejudices and 
passions insensibly become those of Congress, and that without being 
aware of it this Assembly is no more than the instrument of its first 
Minister.23  
Jay had thus become the de facto prime minister of the United States—a 
position previously held by Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris. But 
when Morris threatened to retire one too many times if Congress did not do 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22 Jay’s Report on the Stanhope Affair, Office for Foreign Affairs, August 16, 1785, ibid., 753. DS, DNA 
(EJ: 3850); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 4522). 
 
23 Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Vergennes, New York, January 10, 1786, ibid., 3:64-65. 
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his bidding, Congress accepted the offer and Morris resigned. Immediately 
upon taking office, Jay moved to fill that political vacuum. 
 Although Jay did not personally care for French Foreign Minister 
Vergennes, he greatly admired Vergennes’ skills and modeled his own 
secretaryship on Vergennes’s realpolitik sprinkled with a considerable dose 
of Jay’s own ever-present sense of morality.24 
 Jay brought with him into office a general distrust of other 
governments, particularly the three European superpowers. Alexander 
Hamilton described Jay as “a man of profound sagacity & pure integrity, yet 
he was of a suspicious temper.”25 Jay admitted to his predecessor “I have no 
faith in any Court in Europe, but it would be improper to discover that 
sentiment.” Boundary disputes with the North American colonies of Britain 
and Spain concerned Jay throughout his tenure, and Spain’s refusal to allow 
free American navigation of the Mississippi River proved to be Jay’s 
diplomatic Achilles’ heel. Jay worried that Spain was “turning her eyes to 
England for a more intimate connection. They are the only two European 
powers which have continental possessions on our side of the water, and 
                                                 
24 Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Vergennes, New York, October 1, 1785, ibid., 2:840. 
 
25 Hamilton: Speech in Congress, Philadelphia, March 19, 1783 (taken from James Madison’s notes), 
Kaminski, Founders on the Founders, 271. 
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Spain I think wishes for a league between them for mutual security against 
us.”26 
 Jay’s distrust of France had begun with his appointment as a peace 
commissioner and intensified during the war when France supported Spain’s 
territorial claims east of the Mississippi and when it was revealed that the 
French were negotiating with the British for additional fishing rights off 
Newfoundland, at the Americans’ expense. After the Revolution, Jay de-
emphasized the Franco-American alliance of 1778, actively opposed any 
European combination against American interests, and always sought to 
counter-balance the three European powers. 
 Commercially, Jay discarded Congress’s previous open-ended, most-
favored-nation policy in favor of limited-term commercial treaties based on 
bilateral reciprocity with as much free trade as was advantageous to both 
parties. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress did not have the 
power to regulate commerce, therefore Jay possessed limited leverage in 
negotiating commercial treaties with Britain and Spain, and he never 
removed the restrictions placed on American commerce with the British, 
French, and Spanish West Indies. But he did nothing to stop the tried and 
true, and patriotic, method of American commerce—smuggling American 
                                                 
26 To Robert R. Livingston, Paris, April 22, 1783, Johnston, Correspondence, 3:42-43. LS, DNA (EJ: 
11916); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 4246). 
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agricultural produce into prohibited West Indies ports. (As Chief Justice of 
the United States, Jay would seek to end smuggling goods into American 
ports under the new Constitution when the federal government became 
dependent on the revenue produced from impost duties.) In the mid-1780s, 
Jay encouraged the efforts of Jefferson and Lafayette in obtaining 
commercial concessions from France (including the creation of four free 
ports in France itself). He even proposed that the French government make 
subsidies directly to American merchant houses, so that they in turn could 
extend long-term credit to their customers. 
 Many of Jay’s policies anticipated the later role of the president in 
foreign affairs under the Constitution. Jay believed that secrecy was vitally 
important in his office. Only on “extraordinary Occasions and for cogent 
Reasons” should the public be privy to diplomatic negotiations. In particular, 
Jay did not want to compromise his extensive spy network in Europe. Even 
relatively ordinary, non-sensitive matters should be kept secret because it 
was “better to keep many unimportant Things secret, than by observing too 
little Reserve, destroy or impair that Opinion which encourages Information 
and free Communications.”27 Repeatedly, Jay was described as reserved. In 
dealing with foreign diplomats, Jay kept his own opinion secret and, 
                                                 
27 Jay’s Report on a Letter from Richard Soderstrom, Office for Foreign Affairs, October 6, 1785, Giunta, 
Emerging Nation, 2:844. DS, DNA (EJ: 3863); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 4533). 
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according to Otto, “never responds directly to any question that is put to 
him, and the few words that he permits himself to say, are so laconic that it 
is difficult to divine the sense of them.”28 
 After receiving information from abroad, or after being requested by 
Congress to investigate a matter, or after deciding to take the initiative 
himself, Jay would make a report to Congress. (He made over 500 of them.) 
The report would often contain a draft of instructions to him or a draft of a 
letter that he should write to some diplomat—American or foreign. Congress 
would often assign the secretary’s report to a select committee, which would 
almost always report favorably on Jay’s recommendations. Congress would 
then approve the committee report and instruct Jay to do its bidding. On 
other occasions, Congress avoided the sham of a committee, and merely read 
and approved Jay’s report and referred it back for him “to take Order.” 
 Of course Jay had to struggle against various divisive forces 
throughout his time in office. The weakness of Congress, the jealousy of the 
states and their congressional delegations toward each other, the personal 
enmity and jealousy of a handful of members of Congress toward Jay 
himself, the institutional framework in which the secretary was presumed to 
be the servant—not the leader—of Congress, the rise of political factions 
                                                 
28 Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Vergennes, New York, January 10, 1786, ibid., 3:65. 
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within Congress, and the disgruntlement of foreign diplomats who believed 
that Jay did not particularly favor their own country—all presented Jay with 
obstacles. Working in his favor, however, was the difficulty of finding 
anyone who could replace him. The list of Jay’s advantages in this respect is 
long: his reputation as an industrious and conscientious man; the 
requirement that all communications from abroad be channeled through him; 
the ignorance of most members of Congress of foreign affairs; the 
mandatory rotation in office required of members of Congress; the relative 
youthfulness and inexperience of members of Congress as compared to Jay’s 
prominence in state, continental, and diplomatic service; his effort to 
disconnect foreign ministers in America from Congress; and his technique of 
obliging foreign emissaries in America to seek his direct assistance in 
correcting diplomatic difficulties. 
 Jay regularly employed delaying tactics in conducting his diplomacy. 
Otto called it a “system of reserve.” This approach drew heavily on Jay’s 
experience in Europe, especially while in Spain. The reasons for delay, 
Secretary Jay would lament, were varied: the translator was overwhelmed 
with work, information from U.S. ministers abroad had not yet arrived, 
Congress was too busy or was torn over whether it had power to act, 
Congress was either in recess or poor attendance prevented it from acting, or 
 17
illness prevented the Secretary from acting. Jay wrote Jefferson that “It is 
painful to me to reflect that altho’ my Attention to Business is unremitted, 
yet I so often experience unseasonable Delays and successive Obstacles in 
obtaining the Decision and Sentiments of Congress, even on Points which 
require Dispatch. But so it is, and I must be content with leaving nothing 
undone that may depend upon me.”29 When Congress procrastinated, Jay 
told Jefferson that he was obliged “to observe a Degree of Reserve in my 
Letters respecting those Subjects, which I wish to be free from, but which is 
nevertheless necessary lest my Sentiments and Opinions should be opposed 
to those which they may adopt and wish to impress.”30 The Secretary 
pleaded for understanding because everyone knew that “the same Expedition 
cannot be expected from public deliberative Bodies as from Executive 
officers or Boards composed of a few Members.” In a candid conversation 
with French Consul-General Otto, Jay explained the difference between 
conducting diplomacy under a republic as opposed to a monarchy. The 
former was far more difficult because 
“the great number of personages to humor rendered political operations 
infinitely more intricate and slower, that in place of two or three well-
                                                 
29 To Thomas Jefferson, New York, August 18, 1786, Julian P. Boyd et al., eds., The Papers of Thomas 
Jefferson (Princeton, N.J., 1950—), 10:271. Dft, NNC (EJ: 5860). 
 




organized brains there were several hundred of various capacities, whose 
interests and fashions of thinking could not easily be made to agree; that a 
King could assemble around him a Council of wise and well-intentioned 
persons, while in a republic the most numerous part preponderated, and that 
the most numerous party was not always the wisest. The happiest 
Government is a well-administered Monarchy.”31 “Wise kings will always 
be served by able ministers.”32 
 Jay always pled for patience and assured all ministers “that the affairs 
to which you solicit the attention of Congress will not be neglected but that 
they will continue to treat all your applications with that Respect which is 
justly due” to every government. Soon, however, the foreign ministers came 
to realize that measures Jay supported received quick congressional attention 
and measures Jay opposed languished. Without a direct connection to 
Congress except through Jay, foreign ministers had to bide their time even 
when confidentially informed by members of Congress that Jay was indeed 
the reason for delay. 
 Early in his tenure, Jay established the protocol for receiving foreign 
diplomats in America. Jay would welcome all newly arrived ministers. A 
                                                 
31 To François Barbè Marbois, New York, March 21, 1785; Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Vergennes, 
New York, August 20, 1785, Giunta, Emerging Nation, 2:595, 787-88. Dft, NNC (EJ: 5717); LbkC, DNA 
(EJ: 1593). 
 
32.“Publius,” The Federalist, No. 64, New York Independent Journal, March 5, 1788. 
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meeting would be arranged with the president of Congress at which the 
diplomat’s commission and letter of credence would be left to be translated. 
At an appointed time, Jay would conduct the minister to Congress in its 
chambers. While members of Congress remained seated and covered (that is, 
with their hats on), the diplomat (uncovered) would turn over the translation 
of his credentials to the secretary of Congress, who would read the document 
aloud. The diplomat might then say something to Congress and present 
anything he thought proper in writing to the secretary of Congress. Jay 
would then escort the diplomat out of the chambers and “hint to him that a 
Visit would be expected by every Member of Congress,”33 quite an onerous 
assignment for the foreign diplomat. 
 The country faced a delicate issue of protocol when Sir John Temple 
arrived in New York in November 1785 as Britain’s consul-general. Two 
questions were posed by Jay to the president of Congress. Should Temple be 
received de jure (by right or by law) or whether it was expedient to receive 
him de gracia (by favor). Citing Vattel’s Law of Nations, Jay answered the 
first question by saying that consuls are useful officials and that the nation 
wanting a consul must procure them by commercial treaty. Because Great 
Britain refused to enter into a commercial treaty with the United States, it 
                                                 
33 Jay’s Report on the Reception of Don Diego de Gardoqui, Office for Foreign Affairs, May 31, 1785, 
Giunta, Emerging Nation, 2:645-46. DS, DNA (EJ: 3838); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 4511). 
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had no right to expect America to receive its consul. The second question 
was far more important to Jay because of the “interesting Consequences 
[that] will result from its Decision.” Jay reasoned that having a consul in 
America was “not a Matter of so much Importance to Britain.” The denial of 
the consul would not force Britain into a commercial treaty with America. 
“Severity on small Points,” Jay suggested, “may irritate, but they very 
seldom coerce.” If Americans wanted to coerce Britain, it should be done 
with a united, federal program of “Retaliatory Restrictions on Trade and 
Navigation.” Such a policy would be “very consistent with the Pride and 
Dignity as well as Interest of a Nation. . . . To refuse to receive a consul 
would (whatever might be the true Motives), be generally ascribed to a 
Degree of Pique and Irritation which though Nations may feel, they ought 
not expressly or impliedly to declare.” Thus, in his report to Congress, Jay 
recommended that it would “be proper for the United States on this, and 
every other Occasion, to observe as great a Degree of Liberality, as may 
consist with a due Regard to their national Honor and Welfare.” Jay then 
suggested and Congress agreed that Temple be received and recognized as 
Great Britain’s consul-general.34 
                                                 
34 To the President of Congress, Office for Foreign Affairs, November 24, 1785; Jay’s Report on the 
Reception of Sir John Temple as British Consul General, Office for Foreign Affairs, November 28, 1785, 
ibid., 2:918-19, 929. LS, DNA (EJ: 163); Dft, NNC (EJ: 5785); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 1808). DS, DNA (EJ: 
3874); LbkC, DNA (EJ: 4544). 
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 Remembering the unreasonable limitations placed upon the peace 
negotiators by Congress during the war, Secretary Jay gave the diplomats 
under his direction much more latitude to operate. He told them that they 
would “probably meet with Difficulties and Embarrassments of various 
kinds in the Prosecution” of their business. “But Difficulties and 
Embarrassments are not new to You, and Experience has taught us that there 
are very few which Talents, Assiduity and Perseverance cannot 
overcome.”35 
 In dealing with European and North African courts, Jay understood 
that it might be necessary to bribe “Men who may have no other 
Recommendation than their influence with their Superiors.” Jay 
acknowledged the expediency of purchasing “the Influence of those whom 
you may find so circumstanced, as to be able to impede or forward your 
Views.” Rather than paying any such “Gratuities before the Work is done, 
[which] might tempt them to delay it,” in hopes of extracting more money, 
Jay suggested that it might be “prudent to promise Payment on the 
Completion of the Treaties.” These, Jay said, “are delicate Subjects which 
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your greater Experience well enables you to manage.”36 Jay followed his 
own advice and promised an aide of the emperor of Morocco that Congress 
would “take a proper Opportunity of acknowledging the Sense they entertain 
of your Regard for their Interests.”37 
 Although bribes to individuals to speed along negotiations were 
acceptable, Jay adamantly opposed tribute to countries as the price of 
avoiding war. War should not be entered into lightly, but should be 
legitimately declared when honorable alternatives were unavoidable. Jay 
believed that it was America’s true interest “to prepare for War, and yet be 
tenacious of Peace with all the World.”38 The Barbary Powers put Jay’s 
philosophy to the test toward the end of his first year as Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs. 
 After months of cordial negotiations, the United States, with the good 
auspices of Charles III of Spain, signed a treaty with Morocco. Simultaneous 
negotiations took place with Algiers but in a far more hostile climate. Soon 
Algiers captured two American merchantmen and enslaved their crews. The 
Dey of Algiers demanded tribute. Believing that a war with Algiers would 
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be too costly and too difficult to win, John Adams recommended that 
America should pay the tribute. Thomas Jefferson thought Algiers could be 
defeated easily and would thus be a good enemy for America to flex its 
muscles with. Jay told Jefferson he “prefer[red] War to Tribute.” Jay felt that 
the United States should recognize that a state of war existed with Algiers 
and should do whatever was necessary to repel the aggression. In his report 
to Congress, Jay argued that this “War being unprovoked, and made solely 
with [the] Design to acquire Plunder; it would not in the Opinion of your 
Secretary, become the United States to answer it by Overtures for Peace, or 
Offers of Tribute.... That both the Honor and Interest of the United States 
demand that decided and vigorous Measures be taken for protecting the 
American Trade and meeting these predatory Enemies in a proper 
Manner.”39 
 French Consul-General Otto reported that Secretary Jay had ulterior, 
political motives for war with Algiers. First, Jay believed that the United 
States could easily “overawe the Barbary Corsairs, without stooping to pay 
them tribute.” And equally important, Jay allegedly told Otto that he “would 
not be angry if the Algerians came to burn some of our maritime Towns, in 
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order to restore to the United States their former energy, which peace and 
Commerce have almost destroyed. War alone can bring together the various 
States, and give a new importance to Congress; we will not lack means, but 
we lack that republican and national spirit which alone can give vigor to our 
operations. We have more need of soldiers than of Merchants, of patriotism 
than of foreign manufactures, of Citizens than of rich privateers. War, and 
war alone, will give us Citizens, patriotism, and soldiers. Commerce has 
already separated the interests of the various States, war will give them 
identity. I want the New Englanders to fight for the wheat, tobacco, and rice 
of the Southern people, and the Carolinians to shed the last drop of their 
blood for the fisheries of Massachusetts.”40 Sensing the ill preparedness of 
the country, Congress preferred to negotiate first before declaring war. But if 
the tribute demanded was too high, war would ensue.  
 In the meantime, Jay suggested that American merchants trading in 
the area should be encouraged “to employ none but Vessels well armed and 
manned.” Private vessels that could accommodate armaments should be 
equipped by Congress with twenty cannon and the military stores and sailors 
necessary to man these weapons. Congress should also begin construction of 
five forty-gun frigates to cruise those dangerous waters, and establish a 
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department of the navy headed by a single secretary. Jay also recommended 
military and commercial alliances with Portugal, another country at war with 
Algiers. At one time Jay advocated a coalition of tribute-paying countries to 
ally in their attacks on the Barbary pirates—a sort of short-term, ad hoc 
NATO. Jay’s report presumed “that the United States should extend their 
Views and Wishes to naval Strength and maritime Importance.” Now was 
the time to decide “Whether it would be more wise in the United States to 
withdraw their Attention from the Sea, and permit Foreigners to fetch and 
carry for them; or to persevere in concerting and pursuing such Measures as 
may conduce to render them a maritime Power?” Jay told the President of 
Congress that “while we lend our Attention to the Sea, every naval War 
however long which does not do us essential Injury, will do us essential 
Good.” “The more we are treated ill abroad,” Jay suggested, “the more we 
shall unite and consolidate at Home.” Jay wrote John Adams that the 
Algerine war, the construction of a navy, and the granting of commercial 
powers to Congress seriously divided members of that body. The Northern 
and Middle States supported these policies, while the Southern States and 
Westerners opposed them.41 
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 Provoked into an aggressive posture by Algiers, Secretary Jay also 
recommended to Congress that it advise Massachusetts “to proceed without 
Noise or Delay to garrison such places” on its northern borders that seemed 
threatened by settlement from the British in the Province of New Brunswick 
(Canada). Because “one unopposed Encroachment always paves the way for 
another,” Jay suggested that the whole disputed area could be lost if 
Massachusetts failed to act. Garrisons manned by Massachusetts militia, 
paid by Congress, and relieved by Continental troops “should not be so large 
as to give alarm,” but they should encourage local inhabitants to pledge their 
allegiance to the United States while overawing New Brunswick peace 
officers, “whom Impunity might tempt to be insolent and troublesome.” 
These military forces should be ordered to stay in American territory and to 
act only defensively. This delicate mission could be safely entrusted to the 
prudence of the governor and council of Massachusetts. “Nothing should be 
done to provoke Hostilities on the one Hand, and on the other it must be 
remembered that too great and manifest Reluctance to assert our Rights by 
Arms, usually invites Insult and offence. Your Secretary is very 
apprehensive that to permit these disputes to remain unsettled, will be to 
risque mutual acts of violence which may embroil the two Nations in a war.” 
Jay warned Congress “that no Nation can consistent with the Experience of 
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all Ages, expect to enjoy peace and Security any longer than they may 
continue prepared for war, and he cannot forbear expressing his Fears, that 
the United States are not at present in that desireable Situation.”42 
 Jay felt anxious about the disputed territory between Massachusetts 
and Canada because of the growing number of separatist movements taking 
place throughout the country. Vermont kept up its battle for independence 
from New York, while demands for independence surfaced in Maine from 
Massachusetts, in Kentucky from Virginia, and in Frankland from North 
Carolina. Jay lamented that Congress had not acted more swiftly in 
suppressing these rebellious Americans. “Congress should have recollected 
the old Maxim obsta principiis”—resist the beginnings; stop it now.43 
 Jay’s ability as a diplomat was stretched to the limit in dealing with 
Britain’s refusal to abandon its eight frontier forts along the coasts of the 
Great Lakes. By retaining the forts, contrary to a provision in the Treaty of 
Peace, the British controlled the lucrative fur trade, intrigued with Indians, 
encouraged an American separatist movement, and perhaps of most 
importance to Jay, was a blatant, public snub of America’s sovereignty. Jay 
wondered why Britain would jeopardize its long-term relationship with 
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America to obtain only short-term benefits. “They may hold the Posts, but 
they will hold them as Pledges of Enmity; and the Time must and will come 
when the Seeds of Discontent, Resentment and Hatred which such Measures 
always sow, will produce very bitter Fruit.” 
 In a remarkably blunt and yet equally obscure statement, Jay 
suggested that it would be “very Justifiable in Congress to take a certain 
Step that would be longer and more sensibly felt by Britain than the 
Independence of these States.”44 John Adams, serving as U.S. minister to 
Britain, searched out Secretary Jay for his meaning. Adams thought that Jay 
alluded to two possible courses of action—one commercial; the other 
military. British ships could be prohibited from carrying American exports 
and heavy import duties could be placed on British manufactured goods. 
More militant, Adams wondered whether Jay was proposing “a defensive 
Alliance with France, Spain and Holland” in which Canada and Nova Scotia 
and at least one-half of the best British West Indies would be acquired by the 
United States, while France, Spain and the Netherlands would open their 
West Indies to American produce and French home ports would be opened 
to free American trade.45 
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 Before proceeding with diplomatic discussions with Britain, Jay 
unofficially asked and then officially instructed Thomas Jefferson, serving 
as U. S. minister to France, to sound out French Foreign Minister 
Vergennes. “Does France consider herself bound by her Guarantee to insist 
on the Surrender of our Posts? Will she second our Remonstrances to Britain 
on that Head?” Such a united diplomatic stand, Jay hoped, “may render any 
less pacific Proceedings unnecessary.”46 
 In discussions between John Adams and British Foreign Secretary 
Lord Carmarthen, the British asserted that they retained the Northwest posts 
because Americans had violated at least two provisions of the Peace Treaty. 
The states had adopted laws that made it impossible for British creditors to 
collect pre-war debts and the states refused to compensate Loyalists for 
property illegally confiscated from them and refused to restore voting rights 
to Loyalists. Not until these violations were removed, would the Northwest 
posts be evacuated. 
 Jay advised Adams to proceed cautiously “so as to avoid demanding a 
categorickall Answer. . . . in the Negative [which] would involve the United 
States either in War or in Disgrace—They are not prepared for the former, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 




and should if possible avoid the latter.”47 Furthermore, Adams should not 
push the matter while France’s intentions remained uncertain. Jay then 
reported to Congress that it was unlikely that the forts would be surrendered. 
The Secretary recommended “that what wrongs may have been done [by the 
state legislatures], should be undone; and that the United States should, if it 
were only to preserve Peace, be prepared for War.”48 
 Responding to the impasse over the forts, Jay sent Congress one of his 
longest and most important reports. In adopting the Articles of 
Confederation, Jay argued that “the thirteen independent Sovereign States” 
had “formed and vested in Congress a perfect though limited Sovereignty for 
the general and National purposes specified in the Confederation.” Article 
IX gave “Congress the sole and exclusive Right and Power of determining, 
on war and peace and of entering into treaties and Alliances &c &c—When 
therefore a treaty is constitutionally made, ratified and published by 
Congress, it immediately becomes binding on the whole Nation, and 
superadded to the laws of the land, without the intervention, consent or fiat 
of State Legislatures.” Thus, it was Congress’ responsibility “to see that 
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National treaties be faithfully observed throughout the whole extent of their 
jurisdiction.” 
 Jay’s report continued. In examining the British accusations, Jay 
found that the states had indeed violated two treaty provisions by enacting 
laws that impeded the collection of prewar British debts and by confiscating 
Loyalist property after the treaty had been adopted. “Under such 
circumstances,” Jay told Congress, “it is not a matter of surprize to your 
Secretary that the Posts are detained.” 
 Recognizing Congress’ lack of power over the states, Jay outlined a 
three-point plan that would allow America to escape from its embarrassing 
diplomatic dilemma. First, Congress should declare that no state could pass 
any act “for interpreting, explaining or construing a National treaty or any 
part or Clause of it; nor for restraining, limiting, or in any manner impeding, 
retarding or counteracting the operation and execution of the same.” Treaties 
properly made were the law of the land. Secondly, all acts now existing 
“repugnant to the treaty of Peace ought to be forthwith repealed.” And 
finally, that instead of repealing individual acts separately, Congress should 
recommend that each state “pass an Act declaring in general terms that all 
such Acts and parts of Acts repugnant to the treaty of Peace . . . are 
repealed.” State courts would then have the authority and would have “no 
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difficulty in deciding” in various cases before them which state laws were 
repugnant to the treaty and thus were null and void under this general act of 
repeal.49 
 Jay’s report also considered the British violation of the treaty 
provision forbidding them from carrying away slaves at the end of the war 
when their armies were evacuating. Not surprisingly, Jay was somewhat 
sympathetic to the British position. He posed a hypothetical case of a war 
between France and Algiers in which the former would rescue and free 
American sailors held as slaves by the latter. Would it be justifiable after the 
restoration of peace for France to return “those American Slaves to their 
Algerine Masters?” The only difference in the two cases was “that the 
American Slaves at Algiers are white People, whereas the African Slaves at 
New York [that the British carried off] were Black People.” Consideration 
must be given to “How far an obligation to do wrong may consistent with 
morality be so modified in the execution as to avoid doing injury and yet do 
essential Justice.” By agreeing to this article of the treaty, Britain “bound 
herself to do great Wrong to these Slaves, and yet by not executing it she 
would do great Wrong to their Masters.” Jay suggested a solution to this 
“painful dilemma.” No slave should be returned but the British should 
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compensate all American masters who lost slaves carried off by the British. 
“In this way neither [slaves nor masters] could have just cause to complain.” 
An independent commission should be established to determine how many 
slaves were carried off and their value.50 
 On March 21, 1787, Congress adopted Jay’s report. Three weeks later 
the president of Congress sent a circular letter (drafted by Jay) to the state 
governors explaining the diplomatic morass and asking that their states 
comply with Congress’ resolution. Public faith demanded that the treaty be 
honored. “Not only the obvious dictates of Religion, Morality and National 
honor, but also the first principles of good policy, demand a candid and 
punctual compliance with engagements constitutionally and fairly made. . . . 
honest Nations like honest men require no constraints to do Justice, and 
though Impunity and the Necessity of Affairs may sometimes afford 
temptations to pare down contracts to the measure of Convenience yet it is 
never done but at the expence of that esteem, and confidence, and credit, 
which are of infinitely more worth than all the momentary advantages which 
such expedients can extort.”51 Congress meant “to act with the most 
Scrupulous regard to Justice and Candor toward Great Britain, and with an 
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equal degree of delicacy, Moderation, and decision towards the States” who 
had violated the treaty. “Justice to Great Britain, as well as regard to the 
honor and Interests of the United States, require that the said Treaty be 
faithfully executed.” Minister John Adams was ordered to inform George III 
that “Congress are taking effectual measures for removing all Cause or 
Complaint on their part.” It was expected that Britain too would carry “every 
article [of the treaty] into real & compleat effect.”52 Part of Jay’s diplomatic 
philosophy was to put America in the position of right. As he later wrote to 
President Washington, “To put an enemy in the wrong is to obtain great 
advantages.”53 Jay’s expectations were not immediately realized. Not until 
1794 was Britain willing to surrender the frontier posts. 
 Jay hoped that his tenure as de facto prime minister would serve as a 
transition. Most of America’s problems could be solved according to Jay, if 
Congress would be given sufficient powers to regulate commerce and to 
levy a federal tariff that would bring in a revenue independent of any 
solicitation upon the states. Jay felt that “Our affairs are settling by degrees 
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into order.”54 With these few additional congressional powers, Congress 
would look more and more like the British House of Commons. 
 By the end of 1786, however, Jay’s hopes for change and optimism 
about America’s future waned. Postwar economic depression; continuing 
diplomatic problems with Great Britain, Spain, and the Barbary States; and 
secessionist movements in almost half of the states and in the west all 
weighed heavily on America. The limited authority allowed Congress by the 
Articles of Confederation made it unlikely that solutions to America’s 
problems would emanate from the central government. “Although a 
Disposition prevails” to increase the powers of Congress, Jay was 
“apprehensive that however the Propriety of the Measure may be admitted, 
the Manner of doing it will not be with equal Ease agreed to.”55 Jay told 
Jefferson, “It takes time to make sovereigns of subjects.”56 
 When, in mid-1786, Jay’s negotiations with Spanish envoy Don 
Diego de Gardoqui exploded in bitter sectional hostility, any attempt to 
strengthen the Articles of Confederation out of Congress seemed hopeless. 
In fact, because of the South’s outrage over the Jay-Gardoqui negotiations 
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and the potential loss of the navigation of the Mississippi River, Congress 
tabled seven amendments to the Articles of Confederation that had been 
prepared to be sent to the states for their ratification.57 These amendments 
would have significantly increased Congress’ powers and would have been a 
major step in moving Congress toward Jay’s parliamentary model. Thus, 
ironically, the actions of the country’s “prime minister”—the staunchest 
advocate for empowering Congress—doomed the effort to amend the 
Articles of Confederation and forced nationalists to seek a different method 
of strengthening America’s central government. 
 As the Constitutional Convention ended its sessions, Jay confided to 
Jefferson: “For my own part, I have long found myself in an awkward 
Situation, seeing much to be done and enabled to do very little. All we can 
do is to persevere—if Good results our Labor will not be in vain, if not we 
shall have done our Duty, and that Reflection is valuable.”58 
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